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Tuesday, February 10, 2009

Russian Debt And The Euro

Keynes’s genius – a very English one – was to insist we should approach an economic system not as a morality play but as a technical challenge.
Martin Wolf, Financial Times


The euro fell again yesterday, by 1.1 percent against the dollar (to $1.2860) and by 1.2 percent against the yen (to 117.52 yen). The change, even if quite large in a short space of time, is hardly dramatic, but what is of more interest is the why. Russian companies announced yesterday that they were thinking of opening negotiations to "restructure" their debt. Bloomberg:

The euro fell after a Russian bank official said the nation’s lenders asked the government to help moderate talks with foreign lenders on $400 billion of loans, adding to speculation financial turmoil in Europe is worsening.

The euro fell versus 13 of the 16 most-active currencies after Anatoly Aksakov, president of the Russian Association of Regional Banks, said in an interview with Bloomberg News that the group has written to the government after talking with foreign banks. He said $135 billion of the loans are due this year and the remainder of the $400 billion within four years.

The “report of rescheduling debt is driving the euro lower because European financial institutions have a bigger exposure to Russia than their counterparts in other countries,” said Takashi Kudo, Tokyo-based director of foreign-exchange sales at NTT SmartTrade Inc., a unit of Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Corp., Japan’s largest fixed-line phone company.


And then there is Kazakhstan to think about:

Kazakhstan’s banks may have their ratings cut as the devaluation of the nation’s currency makes it harder for them to repay foreign debt and “substantially increases” credit risk, Moody’s Investors Service said yesterday.


And Mr Euro, like me, is getting worried:

The widening spreads between the interest rates that different euro-area nations must pay bond investors are “worrying developments,” according to a “speaking note” prepared for Luxembourg Finance Minister Jean-Claude Juncker and obtained by Bloomberg News.


In fact, while there is a growing feeling that the worst phase of the financial-system meltdown may be over in the U.S, unease is mounting that here in Europe the worst may be yet to come. The reason? Europe's commercial banks have more exposure to distressed emerging markets than their U.S. counterparts. By one estimate, European banks provided three-quarters of the $4.7 trillion in cross-border loans to the Baltic countries, Eastern Europe, Latin America and emerging Asia. Thus it is quite likely that the emerging-markets exposure of European banks exceeds even that of U.S. lenders to Alt-A and subprime loans.

“People expect that part of these debts were from the European banking system,” said Sebastien Barbe, a strategist at Calyon in Hong Kong, the investment banking unit of France’s Credit Agricole SA. “You already have a very weak banking system in Europe. If you have these Russian issues, the next step would be questions about whether similar problems will come out of other Eastern European countries.”


Dory Wiley, president of Commerce Street Capital, a money-management firm that invests in banking stocks argues that "most of the big banks in Europe are insolvent........That is what made them great - but unpredictable - shorts. They represent major components in those country funds everyone buys." The big danger now is that European governments, since they are the prime backstops for their commercial banks, will see their debt liabilities balloon and steadily be forced, in a domino like contagion process onto the slippery path towards downgrade, rising yield spreads and default.

Unicredit Saved Again By Libya


I think it should now go without saying that Unicredit is deeply involved in many of the most problematic countries from this point of view - Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to name but three. So while, as reported here yesterday, the Italian bank seems to have scraped its way over the latest hurdle thanks largely to the timely intervention of the Libyan central bank, this hardly seems to be a stable situation (links to the posts which give some background on all of this can be found here).

Libya's central bank will fill half of a 500 million euro ($645.5 million) gap in bank UniCredit SpA's 3 billion euro capital raising measures, newspapers reported on Monday. Shareholders Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Torino (CRT) and Carimonte Holding will also take up about 230 million euros of the shortfall, Il Messaggero newspaper said...........La Stampa said Libya's central bank would hold about 7 percent in UniCredit after the capital increase and become the biggest single shareholder.


Making The Punishment Fit The Crime, Or the Crime Fit The Punishment?

Many readers are, unsurprisingly, outraged by the idea that the EU should create bonds to help a distressed Italian (or Austrian, or Irish) banking sector. Typical of many responses is this from an Italian:

I'd favour a liberal approach, but it's only my humble opinion, anyway I think bad banks should have to pay for bad policies, households should have to pay for their reckless borrowing, governments should have to pay for communicating the sunstainability of currency pegs and expantion policies. I'd like to see these kind of attitude, negotiating a volunteer currency convesion and a longer repayment time for forex loans, sharing the losses and extra costs among banks borrowers and government. otherwise the ones who acted properly will not see any advantage in acting the right way.


I think this view is being advanced in a very well meaning way, in the sense that the person voicing it simply wants to see some sort of justice, some sort of sense of responsibility. But as I pointed out in my reply to him, the issues here are systemic ones, and the majority of Germany's citizens are hardly responsible for the bad decisions made by representatives of the Russian subsidiaries of their banks. What I am trying to say is there is no effective mechanism as far as I can see whereby those who took the decisions (many of whom are already bankrupt, and others soon to become so) can be made to pay up and put things right. Meantime innocent parties get trampled on. Being intentionally emotive for a second, think about the one million people who lost their jobs in India in December, and all those millions of other people in poor countries across the globe, what responsibility did they have for the irresponsible lending practices of a limited group of Unicredit managers and employees who caused the financial shock waves they are now receiving?

Take the Latvian case. Looking through the IMF standby loan document, I was amazed to find that as a result of this bailout national debt to GDP will rise from 8% in 2008 to 50% in 2010. The thing is the only "crime" of those Latvian citizens caught up in the Parex problem were those who happened to have their money on deposit there. Now such were the covenants on the syndicated loans contracted by the banks that those who provided them (they certainly knew what they were doing) seem to have first call on any funds the government puts into the bank over and above the needs of the hard pressed depositors. Given the rapid population ageing Latvia now has coming and the serious economic growth problem they face as a result of the boom bust my feeling is that they will be unable to fully recover from the blow and will more than likely have to do some sort of sovereign default at some stage - unless, of course, they are admitted to the eurozone, the debt is "restructured" and some kind of EU institutional support offered. I personally consider the current "sit back and watch" approach to be grossly unfair, especially given that the root of their problem really lies in making it a condition of their EU membership that they join the eurozone, and then withdrawing the possibility when the financial destabilising effects of the original condition send their economy sprialing out of control.

Bad decisions were certainly taken by Latvian politicians, but I have no doubt that the fundamental structural cause of their current problems was the one I have just mentioned. So sending a whole country into bankruptcy because of the decisions and speculation of a few people in a bad bank does not seem to be like using our emotional intelligence, and this is why I think the EU have to help them. We simply cannot continue to perpetuate this kind of injustice in our midst.

I can't help feeling that inflicting significant economic pain on large numbers of innocent people is not a fitting process of retribution. It is more akin to the unfortunate campaign of intensive bombing carried out by the Allied Powers against Dresden, simply to make the German people "pay" for the crimes of Adolf Hitler. It is amazing to me that we are still having the same kinds of argument 60 odd years later.

We live in an imperfect world and the reality principle suggests we accept it as such. When you get hit by a tragedy in your life the best advice, I think, is that you do a bit of psychological counselling, put the issue behind you, and get on with your life. Don't go off on a "fatal attraction" kind of obsessive vendetta to try to make the guilty parties pay. Just do what has to be done, stop Europe's financial system melting down, change the regulations for the future, and let's all go to work and get on with things. A first step in this direction would be - as I argued on Sunday - for the EU Commission to negotiate a substantial EU Bonds issue with the Swedish, Italian and Austrian governments, and stopping the rot on this whole problem before things get further out of hand.

Saturday, February 07, 2009

Italy Needs EU Bonds And It Needs Them Now!

You see, this isn’t a brainstorming session — it’s a collision of fundamentally incompatible world views.
Paul Krugman

As a wise man recently said, failure to act effectively risks turning this slump into a catastrophe. Yet there’s a sense, watching the process so far, of low energy. What’s going on?
Paul Krugman
First, focus all attention on reversing the collapse in demand now, rather than on the global architecture. Second, employ overwhelming force. The time for “shock and awe” in economic policymaking is now.
Martin Wolf

OK, I think no regular reader of this blog could seriously suggest I have much sympathy for the sort of views you normally find being propagated by Italy's Finance Minister Guilio Tremonti, but when he starts to send out the kind of red warning light danger signals that he has been doing over recent days, then I think we should all be taking note, and when the republic is in danger, then its all hands to the pumps, regardless of who is sounding the alert. This is not a brainstorming session, it is a real flesh and blood crisis.

Perhaps few of you will have noticed it, but our erstwhile logician has been getting extremely nervous in recent days, and most notably chose his visit to Davos to indicate that he personally would look extraordinarily favourably on any move to inititiate the creation of EU bonds (for a brief explanation of why these are important, see Wolfgang Munchau's argument in favour of such bonds here. (Or the longer version here)

Italy's Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti has said he favoured the issuance of government debt by the European Union. "Now my feeling -- I am speaking of a political issue not an economic issue -- is ... now we need a union bond," Tremonti said at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Countries in the euro zone currently issue sovereign debt in their own name, rather than regionally. Bond traders concerned about the mounting public debt of Italy, Greece and Ireland have pushed down the value of their government bonds, sparking speculation they might be driven out of the euro zone.


Now why would he be arguing this? Well the state of Italy's own banking sector would be one part of the explanation, and the fact that the Italian government is in no position to mount a rescue operation on its own given the size of its existing debt to GDP commitment, would be another. In particular, and as I have been arguing, Unicredit - and its Eastern Europe exposure - is a huge worry.

Indeed the situation is now so delicate, that according to this Reuters report last week, Unicredit really doesn't know which government to turn to. The Italian one perhaps, or the Polish one, or "it could consider doing it in Austria".

Italian bank UniCredit is considering requesting state support in Italy and Poland, a source close to the bank told Reuters on Thursday. "The bank does not exclude possible state support in Italy and Poland," the source said on condition of anonymity. In an extract of an interview to be published in Germany's Handelsblatt newspaper on Friday, UniCredit Chief Executive Alessandro Profumo said the bank could consider "state support as insurance against unpredictable events." If the bank does seek state aid, it could consider doing it in Austria, for example, he added.


UniCredit SpA is considering asking for government capital amid the credit crunch, Chief Executive Officer Alessandro Profumo said. “State support as insurance for unforeseeable events” is conceivable, Profumo told Handelsblatt newspaper in an interview at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. A UniCredit official confirmed the comments to Bloomberg. Italy’s top bankers met with central bank Governor Mario Draghi last week to discuss the financial crisis, which has caused bankruptcies and government bailouts across the world, while stocks have plunged and credit markets have seized up. UniCredit and some of its rivals have tumbled in Milan since the start of 2008 amid concern about the strength of their finances.
Bloomberg 29 January 2009


The announcement that Unicredit was seeking state aid came on the same day that the bank admitted that investors had placed orders for only 0.5 percent of the shares they were offering in a rights issue. The bank received orders for a mere 14.3 million euros of stock out of a total of 3 billion euros, and the plan was to sell leftover stock in the form of convertible bonds, but even this hit a snag, as

The shares were offered at 3.083 euros apiece, or over twice what they were trading for in Milan at the time (around 1.408 euros). Shareholders, including Allianz SE and the Central Bank of Libya, are among those who agreed to buy the convertible bonds, according to the bank offer document. Shares of UniCredit have dropped 54 percent since October, when the rights offering was announced, amid concern the capital raising won’t be sufficient. But even the bonds issue is running into trouble, since Il Sole 24 Ore reported that Unicredit may raise only 2.5 billion euros rather than the full 3 billion euros because because investor Fondazione CariVerona, which holds a 5 percent stake in the bank, reportedly hasn’t received approval from the government to buy the securities, however, the reason they have not received approval may well be that they have not yet applied since the Italian Treasury, in what is a rather unusual step, said on Thursday announced that they had yet to receive a request from CariVerona to sign up for the bond issue. All this suggests, of course, that Tremonti's warning about an imminent bailout could be a piece of brinksmanship, designed to presssure CariVerona to stop playing "positioning" games and come up with the money, but irrespective of whether or not this is the case, some sort of rescue operation for Unicredit surely cannot be far away at this point.

And the fact that Bulgaria's Finance Minister Plamen Oresharski was running around last week assuring everyone that Bulgaria's banks have not asked for state rescue aid so far, and that the government is not worried about the banking system's health for now, is hardly helping to calm already troubled nerves. About 80 percent of the 29 commercial banks operating in Bulgaria are foreign-owned, with the biggest lenders being run by Italy's UniCredit, Hungary's OTP Bank, Greece's National Bank of Greece and Austria's Raiffeisen.

And only today Tremonti has warned that the announcement of more EU bank bailouts is imminent, and maybe as early as this weekend.

European governments may have to bail out more banks as soon as “this weekend,” Italian Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti said today. “So far in Europe there have been more than 30 bank bailouts and I can’t rule out that there will be more this week- end,” Tremonti said, speaking at a press conference after today’s Cabinet meeting in Rome.


So how should we address this danger, imminent or otherwise? At this point in time I have four proposals:

a) The creation of EU bonds
b) The introduction of quantitative easing by the ECB (quantitative easing is the monetary policy which is currently being applied in both the US and Japan, and probably soon in the UK too).
c) Letting those members of the East who want to join the eurozone immediately do so.
d) A new "pact" - one which would be much, much stronger than the old Stability and Growth Pact - to be signed by all countries who enter the EU bond system, a pact which gives direct fiscal remedies to Brussels in the event of non-compliance together with a substantial dose of effective control over the economies of individual countries - since nothing, Mr Sr. Tremonti, ever comes completely for free.

Obviously all of this is quite radical, and indeed fraught with danger, but these are hardly normal times. In all of this (d) is obviously the most important part, as any protection given to EU member economies by the Union must be credible and serious. So no country could or should be forced in, but it should also be pointed out to those who chose sovereignty and remaining on the fringes to participation that they would run an enormous risk. Since almost all EU economies seem vulnerable at this point, anyone staying outside could rapidly see themselves exposed to the risk of forced default, since lack of protection is simply an invitation to attack. Letting ourselves get picked off one by one is not an appetising prospect (Latvia, Hungary, Greece, Austria, Italy, Spain, Ireland, the UK, Romania, Bulgaria.........).

Clearly those who wish to remain "dissenters" should have the liberty to do so, but they should bear well in mind that should they do so they could very easily end up in a group - possibly lead by Diego Armando Maradona - together with Yulia Timoshenko (Ukraine), Cristina Fernadez (Argentina), Rafael Correa (Ecuador) and (possibly) whoever is the new prime minister in Iceland, bankrupt, and without the aid of international financial support to help deal with their mess.

Perhaps readers may think I am being rather shrill here, and perhaps at this point Tremonti (for whom I have no afinity, elective or otherwise, see linked post above) is only playing brinksmanship, but if he isn't, and Unicredit is about to need bailing out, then push does quickly come to shove, since the EU leaders agreed on October 12 in Paris to bail out systemic banks, and Unicredit is a systemic bank. So will will need to know how they plan to stand by their commitment, and if they don't, well then everyone of us stands exposed, since credibility rapidly falls towards zero.

Maybe this is a false alarm situation, and Unicredit will not need bailing out this weekend, or the next one, but one day it will, and one day Spain's huge non performing loan and household debt default problem is going to need sorting out. So I think this is a line in the sand situation, and we are much nearer to having to make up our minds which side of the line we are on than many seem think.

To paraphrase Paul Krugman again, in flirting with the idea of whether the first to default should be Greece, or Hungary, we truly are flirting with disaster.

Sunday, February 01, 2009

The Ruble Fall Continues As Unemployment Soars

Russia's current woes can be readily summed up in just one single variable - the value of the ruble - and this value, as we all know, is falling. Almost uncontrollably so.

The bank’s target will be “very quickly” breached without more intervention, said Gaelle Blanchard of Societe Generale SA in London. “Right now the market is convinced it wants to see the ruble lower,” Blanchard said. “As long as the central bank gives these targets, then speculators are going to have something to aim for.”

“The market is testing whether the authorities see this band as something permanent or something that will move,” said Lars Rassmussen, an emerging markets analyst at Danske Bank A/S. “Our view is that they’ll move it because it’s not worth wasting the reserves for a band that is obviously not wide enough.”
First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov expressed regret that the general population failed to fully understand the Central Bank’s policy on the ruble’s exchange rate against the dollar/euro basket. The government did let the ruble depreciate, but it did so gradually, providing plenty of time for people to decide which currency to keep their savings in.





In fact the ruble fell sharply again last Friday, and was on the brink of breaching the target trading band, yet one more time, following its biggest monthly depreciation in more than a decade. The ruble was down at one point by as much as 1.4 percent on the day (to 35.59 per dollar), 1.1 percent away from breaking the 36 per dollar limit. The Russian central bank has now expanded its trading range 20 times since mid-November in a series of attempts to defend the currency. These continuing attempts to hold a line have lead the central bank to use up more than a third of its foreign-currency reserves since last August, a period in which the ruble has fallen some 34 percent slide against the dollar.

The ruble has now depreciated by 20 percent since the start of the year - making January already the worst month for the currency since 1998. And there is obviously more to come, with the government now expecting a decline to 36 per dollar following the latest widening in the trading band, according to First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov speaking in the State Duma last week. This "managed devaluation" is seen as an attempt to avoid a reapeat of what happened back in 1998, when the ruble fell by as much as 29 percent in a single day. Yet the currency has now lost over 30% against the dollar (and weakened substantially against the euro) since last summer and all this spells disaster for domestic banks and industrial companies, whose debt is denominated in dollars and euros but who depended on rouble-denominated revenues.

One of the principal problems facing those banks and companies who have this mismatch if that they have insufficient foreign exchange liquidity, while other parts of the banking and corporate sector are better positioned. That is the aggregate external position understates the extent of the problem, since the lack of internal confidence makes it hard for those who are under severe stress to find the appropriate lenders. In part as a an attempt at a solution to this problem state owned investment bank Vnesheconombank (VEB) is preparing to issue foreign-currency bonds to be placed among Russian banks with excess of foreign currency and then redistribute the currency raised to those in need of foreign currency liquidity. During the last quarter of 2008 the net increase in foreign currency assets in the corporate sector was over $100 bln. According to the central bank external corporate debt redemptions totaling $120 bln are anticpated during 2009, which indicates a shortfall of only $20 billion, yet according to Interfax the total volume of applications for fx support to VEB from Russian companies is $80 bln. Which suggests that a sizeable chunk of the $100 bln accumulated by Russian corporates at the end of last year was not intended for foreign-currency debt redemptions but was instead a means a protecting free liquidity from falling in value. That is they converted their liquidity into USD and Euro to avoid losses (or make gains) from the devaluation.


Inflation Always Carries A Price

The root of Russia's most recent problems is very evidently all that excess inflation which Russia has seen over the last 18 months (if it hadn't been for the inflation there would have been no devaluation, and hence no issue with forex loans), inflation which has taken badly needed competitiveness from Russia's manufacturing industry at a time when the oil and commodity sectors are in the grips of a severe price slump (which means their contribution to the economy is greatly reduced).

Obviously Russia's situation doesn't make for any easy answers, and even devaluation brings with it the problem of the attendant inflationary uptick from imported goods. Russia's month on month inflation is expected to reach 2.4 percent in January 2009, according to the latest estimates from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), and the Economy Ministry currently estimates Russia's whole year inflation could be as high as 13 percent in 2009. In fact the annual rate for last December was 13.3% (see chart below), so they seem to anticipate very little change in the situation. In fact they may be unduly pessimistic here, since they are almost certainly underestimating the force of Russia's current economic contraction, and the collapse in internal demand may well bring Russia's inflation down more rapidly than they are expecting.




Monetary Tightening In The Face Of An Economic Slump

Basically the Russian economy is currently suffering the effects of a long term policy of trying to control the currency value at the same time as being "soft" on inflation. This approach evidently hasn't worked out, and it is to be hoped that some lessons for the future may have been learned, but the sorry reality is that those currently responsible for managing Russia's economy are left with only hard policy options at this point, if they wish to avoid another default. Basically, and on top of all the rest, the economy has two added problems (apart, that is, from the drop in oil prices, the internal credit crunch and the slump in domestic demand): the high inflation, and the capital exit.


Russia's reserves are disappearing for a whole variety of reasons at this point. First there are foreign investors who are simply pulling out - investors have removed about $290 billion from Russia sincethe start of August, according to the latest estimates from BNP Paribas. Secondly the Russia central bank has been using reserves to defend the currency. According to the Central Bank last week, Russia's foreign exchange and gold reserves dropped by nearly $10 billion from $396.2bn to $386.5bn in the week to 23 January.Citigroup calculate that the bulk of that fall was the by-product of a strong negative revaluation effect - which may have exceeded $8 billion - and the strengthening of USD vs EUR and GBP probably subtracted $5.5bn and $3.7bn, respectively, from the total in USD. Nonetheless Russia has spent very large quantities of foreign exchange on supporting the ruble since August . According to Kommerant reports Bank Rossii told Russian bankers in a meeting in the middle of the month that their “managed devaluation” of the ruble was over, but as we can see, this is far from being the case. Nikolai Kashcheev, head of economic research at Moscow-based MDM bank, Russia may abandon the ruble's dollar-euro trading band completely and allow the currency to trade freely, with the central bank only intervening to avert serious economic shocks using a so-called “dirty float” mechanism.
“A dirty float would look like it was a free market but the central bank would still have a measure of control,” said Kashcheev, who forecast the ruble may fall 5.9 percent against the dollar if the central bank made the switch this week. “It would be a preferable outcome to the devaluation because what they’re doing at the moment is costing too much in reserves.”


The central bank sold $3.2 billion last Friday alone, and $800 million Thursday, according to MDM Bank estimates. The bank appears to have stayed out of the market between January 23 and 27, the first three days after widening its exchange-rate band.

Other demands on foreign exchange comes from Russian corporates who need to pay off foreign exchange debt, or simply protect their ruble liquidity from the devaluation fall, and from individuals and households who wish to do the same.

As a result of the reserve and inflation pressures Russia’s central bank has little alternative but to maintain a relatively tight monetary stance, and indeed the bank raised two key interest rates for the third time since the start of November last week, with the repo rate for one-day and seven-day loans being raised to 11 from 10 percent. Now I say "relatively tight", since obviously with CPI inflation currently running at over 13%, even 11% interest rates are negative in Russia (by around 2%), and thus Russian policy rates could be considered somewhat accommodative (though not as accommodative as would be desireable given the strength of the hit the economy just took). At the end of the day terms like "tight" and "accomodative" are relative terms, and it all depends what you are dealing with.
The Central Bank does not rule out the possibility of a new wave of the crisis erupting in the banking sector, the bank's Chairman Sergei Ignatyev told the Russian State Duma on Friday. He noted that although such a risk was unlikely in the near term, it was still fairly possible in the foreseeable future. The new wave of crisis may be brought about by a rise in loan defaults, Ignatyev explained. The Central Bank is holding meetings with bankers and keeping a watchful eye on the situation, the official said, adding that the bank was ready for any new developments. He also noted that an increase in certain banks' capitalization might prove necessary.

Russian media are also reporting that the government anti-crisis committee (which is headed by Deputy Prime Minister Shuvalov) is putting together a rescue plan for carmaker OAO GAZ. If confirmed the move that would mark the first custom built financial rescue of an individual company by the government during the current economic crisis. OAO GAZ, which is based in Nizhny Novgorod, may need $1.6 billion in state funds to continue operating. Shuvalov has confirmed that the government plans to offer substantial support to Russian companies. “The list of such companies will be expanded to 2,000,” he said, noting that it would include both companies involved in the technical modernization of the national economy and those in a difficult financial situation. “To save all companies is impossible and unnecessary".

Another company in difficulties is United Co. Rusal, who are set to sell shares in a private placement as they seek to refinance about $16.3 billion of debt, according to billionaire shareholder and company Chairman Viktor Vekselberg speaking in Davos. The Russian company owes $7 billion to foreign banks, about $6.5 billion to domestic lenders and about $2.8 billion to Mikhail Prokhorov’s Onexim Group. Rusal is in “active” talks with creditors. Rusal, which is Russia’s largest aluminum company, will cut output by as much as 10 percent and freeze investment for about three years. Aluminium fell to a five- year low this month, and profit is projected to slump 88 percent to $476 million this year, according to an estimate by ING Groep NV. Aluminum needs to trade at $1,700 a metric ton for Rusal to be able to service its debt and pursue new projects, according to Vekselberg - aluminum for delivery three months forward was 1.2 percent lower at $1,350 a ton as of 12:18 p.m. on Friday on the London Metal Exchange. Rusal was forced to seek a $4.5 billion bailout from state-owned Vnesheconombank in October to refinance loans used to buy 25 percent of OAO Norilsk Nickel, Russia’s biggest metals and mining company.

So far Russia’s indebted companies have been bailed out by the government, but this year they are due to repay an additional US$117bn to foreign creditors. With opportunities to roll over existing debt limited, and the government’s reserves down by US$200bn since August, the chances of continuing rescues by the federal authorities appear greatly reduced. According to the latest central bank data, some US$117bn of debt needs to be repaid this year, with US$52bn owed by banks and US$62bn by corporations. Debt restructuring looms on the horizon.

Unemployment Surges

Evidently the crunch in the financial economy - Russia's base money shrank dramatically (from 4283 bln rub to 3896 bln rub, that's not far short of 10% in a month) between 29 December and 26 January - is having a serious impact on the real economy, and nowhere is that clearer than in the unemployment numbers. As could have been expected Russia’s unemployment rate rose sharply in December (up to 7.7 percent from 6.6 percent in November), its highest level since November 2005, as industrial production shrank the most in ten years. The total number of unemployed reached 5.8 million people, as compared with 5 million in November.



What is most notable is the sharpness of this rise. Alongside the rise in umployment wages have started to fall, and the average monthly wage fell an annual 4.6 percent in December to 17,112 rubles ($517.85), the first contraction since October 1999 when they fell 2.2 percent. Real disposable income fell 11.6 percent, the biggest contraction since August 1999, according to Rostat. So this is how one part of the mechanism works basically. The oil price drops, the ruble devalues, fx loans become unsustainable, new funding dries up, and then the real economy sinks like a stone, and as the unemployment goes up, household and investment demand go down, and economic activity heads on a downward spiral.

GDP Growth Outlook






First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov told the State Duma today. “The crisis will continue for three years, of which 2009 will be the most difficult,”

If we now turn to economic forecasts for 2009, Economy Minister Alexei Kudrin said last week that Russia's 2009 GDP growth would be close to zero - a figure which was revised down from the Economy Ministry's earlier 2 percent estimate.

“We must be prepared for further economic decline and a conservative tax and budget policy. Yet we will implement our main programs involving the social protection of the population. The reserves we have built up allow us to be up to that task,” Kudrin stressed.

Current government estimates also project capital flight to be between $100 billion and $110 billion in 2009, while budget revenue will be far below the planned RUB 10.9 billion (approx. $307.9bn). Kudrin's present estimate is RUB 6.5 trillion (approx. $183.6bn), with oil exports expected to generate the bulk of the revenue. He says the federal budget is expected to decline by 40 percent, from a projected $300 billion [10.9 trillion rubles] to about $185 billion [6.5 billion rubles]. Russia’s current budget is based on an average oil price of $70 a barrel, even though Urals crude, the country’s chief export blend, has slumped 69 percent from a July record to $43.72 a barrel. As a result Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has told the Finance Ministry to recalculate the budget, with the Economy Ministry now forecasting oil to trade at an average $41

.“These are the real challenges we face for our economy and the budget system,” Shuvalov said. “If we don’t change our budget targets, and simply replace this lost revenue with money from the reserve funds, the budget deficit will be 6.1 percent of GDP.”

Kudrin is suggesting that Russia will probably spend the bulk of its 7.317 trillion ruble oil-fund reserves to protect the budget, some, “but not all,”. The economic crisis is likely to “peak” this year, and tax revenue may slide by 1 trillion rubles, he added. But Elina Ribakova, Chief Economist at Citibank Russia takes a different view:

“They're planning a large fiscal deficit. Kudrin was mentioning six per cent and our estimate is we could reach ten per cent of GDP, which is most of the reserve fund. So under that scenario yes, we could easily run out of money this year. But I hope that by prudent macroeconomic preemptive policies, we'll not allow that to happen.”

Russia's Reserve Fund now stands at 4.7 trillion rubles ($142.5 billion) and the National Wealth Fund at 2.6 trillion rubles ($79 billion). On February 1 2008 the Finance Ministry divided the former Stabilization Fund into the Reserve Fund, which is intended to cushion the federal budget from a plunge in oil prices, and the National Wealth Fund, designed to help Russia carry out pension reforms.

First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov stated that the global financial crisis is expected to last three years, He confirmed the appropriateness of the government’s reserve strategy, noting that the Finance Ministry was under pressure to start using the reserves several months ago. The crisis could be even more severe than was originally thought, he warned. “We are considering a scenario which is already tough enough, but it could get even tougher, with federal and regional budget revenues falling more sharply than we are estimating,” Shuvalov explained.

Unless the oil price recovers soon, Russia's current-account surplus will turn into deficit during 2009 (the Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that it will equal 4% of GDP), meaning that the country would be forced to subsidise vital imports, including food, out of its already strained dollar holdings. Even if an outright default is likely to be avoided, some debt restructuring moves involving the bulk of Russian debt now seem more or less unavoidable.

As for the outlook for Russian GDP, Kudrin's forecast seems somewhat on the optimistic side, and it is interesting to note that Citgroup have now revised to a 3% contraction in 2009 followed by growth of 1.7% in 2010. They argue (and I agree) that the key change in 2009 GDP is likely to come on the domestic consumption side. Private consumption, which accounts for about 80% of total consumption, now looks set to contract significantly (Citigroup forecast 4.6%), even if the government keeps its originally planned level of current spending.

At the same time investment will also contract (Citigroup suggest by 10%) owing to reduced access to credit and further possible cuts in government capital spending (which accounts for about 10% of total investment growth). The government capital injections (an additional US$40 billion, according to Finance Minister Kudrin, Bloomberg, 22 January) is more liekly to go towards covering bank non performing loan losses rather than supporting new credit.

Even more worryingly Citigroup forecast a 10% contraction in new credit. Furthermore, they argue that the government may well have to cut capital spending owing to the need to accommodate increases in social spending and support for the regional governments. As a result of falling income and investment spending imports will fall (perhaps by 20% in dollar terms), this will be positive for the current account deficit (and to some extent for GDP. A 3% CA defeicit thus seems reasonable assuming no rebound in oil prices.

So, not a rosy picture. Next stop some more real economy data next week, and the manufacturing and services PMIs.

Sunday, January 25, 2009

How Near Is The Czech Economy To Recession?

The highly open Czech economy is set to slow down considerably, affected by the deteriorating outlook for its main trading partners. Although GDP growth was still solid in Q3 2008, both exports and imports growth slowed significantly. The global crisis is expected to adversely impact the real economy particularly from the fourth quarter of 2008. Overall, GDP is expected to have grown by 4.2% in 2008 with a strong contribution from the external balance.
EU Commission Forecast January 2009

Analysts and followers of the Czech economy are basically agreed on two things at the moment: that the Czech is slowing (and rapidly), and that the dependence on car exports is a real achilles heal at a time when a generalised credit crunch means that the financing which is needed for people to make car purchases often quite simply isn't there. Beyond this point opinions differ. Some expect the slowdown to end in nothing more than a year of sub par growth, with a bounce-back recovery in H2 2009 (this is the view, for example, of Pasquale Diana at Morgan Stanley). Others take a more pessimistic view - like Danskebank's Lars Christensen - and fear that not only may we see a substantial slowdown (bordering possibly on outright contraction) throughout the whole of 2009. but also that strong deflationary forces are at work, forces which may well lead the Czech National Bank to become one of the first European central banks (hand in hand possibly with the BoE) to get into the tricky area of trying to operate monetary policy near the zero bound. Personally, after a long hard stare at the detailed macro data, I am in the latter camp, and to answer the question I pose in the title of this post, I think the Czech economy is very near to its first quarter of contraction, indeed we may even have seen contraction in Q4 2008. If we didn't it will be a very close call, since the not only has the trade impact been negative, and industrial output dropped like a stone, but domestic consumer demand - as reflected in retail sales - also seems to have been falling.

And the outlook for domestic demand certainly does not look any too positive, if the most recent consumer confidence readings are anything to go by, since these have been falling strongly since the summer, and surely suggest strong weakness in household consumption right across the first half of 2009, at the very least.

Industrial Output Falls Like A Stone


Czech industrial production fell in November at the fastest rate since at least 2000, dropping by 17.4 percent year on year, following a decline of 7.6 percent in October.


This fall is very substantial and it is clear that the Czech authorities urgently need to revise their growth forecasts in the light of this and other recent data, indeed some analysts - Radomir Jac at Generali PPF Asset Management in Prague , for example - are already arguing the drop may well mean the economy already started to contract in the fourth quarter. Others are more cautious. Still, one thing is common across all the analyses, we are talking about cars, cars, and ever less cars.

The collapse in activity across the region in 4Q08 looks truly extraordinary, and was correctly flagged by the PMI surveys, which sank to all-time lows. Trade data and industrial output and, to a lesser extent, retail sales all show a significant loss of momentum towards year-end. Much of this is due to weaker external demand, in particular in the auto sector, which is the region’s most important export. Car sales in the EU have weakened further, and several carmakers have announced a cut in their production plans for 2009. In the Czech Republic, Hyundai said that it plans to move to a four-day workweek and pay workers 70% of their salaries for a period of 1-3 months; Skoda also downgraded its production plans massively for 2009 (from 700k cars to 570k).
Pasquale Diana, Morgan Stanley

The Czech Republic has arguably the most stable economy in central Europe, but at a time when the world is being buffeted by financial crisis, there is no chance it will escape being hit next year. First in the line of fire will be the automotive sector which, with almost 1m cars manufactured this year, is responsible for about 10 per cent of the economy. Almost all are exported to western Europe, where new car sales have plunged in the final months of the year.
Jan Cienski, Financial Times

And the situation is almost sure to get worse, since the Czech Purchasing Managers' Index fell to 32.7 in December, from 37.8 in November, which indicates a very substantial fall in industrial output again in December.


Thus we can expect Q4 industrial output to be a strongly negative factor, and indeed this only marks a steepening of a trend we have been seeing since Q1 2008, if we look at the quarterly chart for movements in manufacturing output below.


Exports Fall And The Trade Balance Deteriorates

The fall in industrial output is basically a reflection of the ongoing deterioration in the CR's performance in external trade, and the drop indemand for exports. The monthly goods trade deficit was CZK 474 million in November, down from the very large CZK3.95 billion deficit registerd in October, but well below the CZK 12 billion surplus clocked up in November 2007.

Exports were down 18% year-on-year in the month compared with a 10.7% fall in October. The statistics office report said the decline in exports was the highest in the entire history of the Czech Republic. Imports declined 13.2% compared with a 5.9% drop in October. Total imports slipped to CZK 195.2 billion from CZK 221.4 billion.


Retail Sales Also Head South


In November, seasonally adjusted retail sales in retail trade (excluding cars) decreased by 0.3% month-on-month (at constant prices) and fell by 0.7%, year-on-year. As far as the automotive sector goes, seasonally adjusted sales were 3.4% down, m-o-m, and 5.1%. Sales were also down 0.7% month on month in October.


Koruna Continues To Fall

With all this negative data it is hardly surprising that the Czech koruna has been weaking significantly of late, and it depreciated again last week, losing as much as 1 percent on Friday alone (hitting 28.255 against the euro at one point, the weakest since July 2007) and 2.1 percent on the week.

Consumer Prices Already Falling

Consumer prices in the Czech Republic were down again in December, and fell by 0.3% when compared with November. Year-on-year consumer prices were up by 3.6 % in December (down from 4.4 % in November), while the whole year average was 6.3 % in 2008.

As is to be expected the month-on-month drop in consumer prices was lead by the fall in automotive fuel - 95 octane petrol hit its lowest level since March 2002, while food and non-alcoholic beverages were mainly down, with pronounced falls in the prices of flour, milk, butter, citrus fruit and sugar (by 6.7 %, 1.7 %, 2.7 %, 8.6 % and 1.9 %, respectively). But prices drop were far more general, and in the health sector, for example, medical products dropped by 0.5 %. Prices of goods in general decreased by 0.5 %, while prices of services increased by 0.1 %.

But what is perhaps more interesting is the way in which the "core" EU HICP index (ie excluding food, alchohol, tobacco and energy) has now been falling since August, and I do not expect to see an increase in this index in 2009, which means we should see negative core inflation in the CR in 2009.



Industrial producer prices are also falling, and were down by an annual 1.5% in November. The most significant price decreases were observed in ‘coke, refined petroleum products’ (-19.0%), ‘basic metals, fabricated metal products’ (-2.1%) and ‘chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres’ (-3.8%). Prices of ‘food products, beverages and tobacco’ fell by 0.5%.

The big issue now is what will happen to inflation expectations? The strongest defence against the arrival of deflation is the expectation of inflation to come. To date these expectations have held up, but they could well turn negative at some point, and if this were to occur it would have a very significant impact on consumer behaviour (since evidently it is more interesting to delay that whimsical purchase till tomorrow, when the thing will be cheaper). If expectations do turn significantly negative, then it could turn out to be very hard work indeed getting them back into positive territory. Which is why I suspect the CNB will be pretty proactive, possibly more proactive than many are anticipating.


Moving Towards The Zero Bound At The CNB?

The Czech National Bank, whose next policy-setting meeting is scheduled for 5 February, have been cutting their benchmark borrowing rate pretty aggresively since last October, taking it down to 2.25 percent at its last meeting in December.

The drop of industrial output is “really considerable,” central bank board member Robert Holman said on Patria.cz. The bank’s “pessimistic” forecast scenario is starting to be fulfilled, he said.

The latest central bank forecast cut the outlook for 2009 economic growth to 2.9 percent, although the bank had an alternative (pessimistic) scenario which foresaw growth of 0.5 percent this year.

Today’s industrial production numbers and the outlook for inflation to drop to just above 1% in January should make the Czech central bank (CNB) even more dovish. We now expect a cut of at least 75bp at the next CNB board meeting in February. Furthermore, we would not rule out that CNB could be the first European central bank (maybe with the Bank of England) to go to (near) zero per cent interest rates. Therefore, we also recommend buying EUR/CZK at current levels.
Lars Christensen and Stanislava Pravdova, Danskebank

So far, January’s economic data published support our view that the CNB’s Bank Board Members are ready to continue easing, following the 150bp cut in policy rates in 2H08 to 2.25%. However, yesterday’s data have led us to review our previous forecast of a 50bp cut in the CNB’s policy rates, and we now believe a 75-100bp cut is likely to be discussed at the February meeting. Furthermore, we do not exclude the possibility that the CNB’s main policy rate could breach its all-time low (which was 1.75% in 2Q-3Q05) in February.
Jaromir Sindel, CitiGroup Global Markets

I am with Lars Christensen and Jaromir Sindel here, I think the CNB will move, and move pretty decisively to try to block the path to looming price deflation, and I guess a 75 bp cut (and possibly more) is looking very probable, with further cuts following inswift succession. Evidently the key piece of data will be the January manufacturing PMI, and in the short term I expect the PMI and not the actual output data (which obviously come later) to be dictating policy decisions. The statist office releases simply serve to calibrate the PMIs (post hoc) in this type of situation.

So What Is The Outlook For Czech GDP Growth in 2009?

Well, in trying to determine the future path of Czech GDP, the first thing we need to bear in mind - looking at the GDP chart above - is that the economy has been losing momentum since late 2006, that is the "stellar" catch-up growth component has been waning, and for some time. The second thing we need to bear in mind is that this is not necessarily a bad thing, since it means that the CR's economy (unlike many others across the CEE) is certainly not on a boom bust cycle. The slowdown in quarter on quarter growth is also evident in the chart below. In fact in Q3 2008, Czech GDP grew by 1.0% in comparison to Q2 2008 and by 4.7% in comparison to Q3 2007.


What is interesting is that the weaker growth we can see in the chart has been largely a by-product of slowing private consumption growth (see my earlier post here, and this one here), which leaves us with the possibility that the Czech Republic economy - following along the path already charted by Germany, Japan, Italy and Hungary - may now be in the process of becoming an export dependent one. (Perhaps it sounds strange to talk about Italy as export dependent given its very weak growth, but this weak growth is in fact the outcome of continuing very poor export performance, since domestic demand has now been weak for more years than I personally care to remember). In fact final domestic consumption was still up by 2.7% in Q3 2008, and represented a contribution of 1.9 p.p. to GDP growth. Final consumption was particularly influenced by a year on year increase in household expenditure by 2.5% , while government expenditure grew by 3.7%. Fiscal stimulus should hold the government component steady, but I would expect the household one to drop back, and especially as we start to see job losses from the industrial contraction.


Gross capital formation was down by 2.0% on Q3 2007 and had a negative impact of 0.5 p.p. on GDP growth, although gross fixed capital formation taken alone was up by 4.5% y-o-y; in fact investment in transport equipment and in machinery and equipment was the main source of GFCF growth.

As in earlier quarters, external trade in goods and services was the main source of economic growth in Q3 and contributed by 2.8 p.p. to the GDP increase, despite a considerable fall in y-o-y growth rate of exports (from 13.9% in Q2 to 5.0% in Q3). This was the result of the marked fall in import growth (from 9.7% to 1.6%), hence external trade remained the principal source of GDP growth.

Reflecting Citi’s expectations of a recession in the eurozone, we forecast the trade surplus (both of goods and services) to shrink significantly in 2009 from its surplus of CZK108 billion in 2008 (our estimate).Falling commodity prices are likely to have been behind the improvement in the terms of trade in November, which fell in October. We believe this development has the following implications: the improvement in the terms of trade is likely to cause the foreign trade’s first negative contribution to GDP growth after three and half years, and GDP growth is likely to fall quickly to the levels of real gross domestic income, which was 2% YoY in 3Q08 and much lower than that of GDP growth of 4.3%.
Jaromir Sindel, CitiGroup Global Markets

Employment May Weaken

Employment growth, which has been one of the hallmark features of the Czech expansion, continued to grow in the third quarter and was up by 0.4% q-o-q and 1.9% y-o-y. Labour productivity measured by gross value added per employed person was also up (by 2.3% y-o-y). There were 5.327 million Czechs in employment in Q3 2008, 98,000 more than in Q3 2007. However, there is now some evidence that this favourable situation may now be changing.

Certainly, if we look at the chart below, the substantial drop in unemployment in the CR since 2005 is very impressive, and indeed even though the seasonally adjusted EU harmonised rate ticked up from 4.4% in October to 4.5% in November (the last month for which Eurostat have released data) the change is hardly a dramatic one.



However, if we look at the data from the CR's owb labour office, we find a reasonably sharp increase from November to December (unemployment was up by 32,000, compared with a 7,000 rise in December 2007), and if we look at the situation vis a vis vacancies (see chart below), then it is clear that the deterioration in manufacturing conditions is now affecting the labour market, since the number of vacancies advertised has now fallen from the April 2008 peak of 152,300 to December's low of 91,200 (the lowest number in over 2 years, which is all I have data for).




CA Deficit To Deteriorate, While Fiscal Spending May Increase As The Slowdown Accelerates



The CR does run a current account deficit, but it is actually a fairly moderate one in a regional context, although it is liable to increase in 2009. November’s narrower current account deficit reflects the slightly improved trade balance over October and lower dividend outflows from FDI, which dropped to CZK3.5 billion from October’s CZK12.3 billion. The current account financing requirement has been low but the deficit may have reached 2.8% of GDP in 2008 (up from 1.8% in 2007, and above the IMF estimate of 2.2% GDP).


The EU Commission forecast thatgeneral government deficit will be 1.2% of GDP in 2008. This reflects a much-lower than- expected deficit of 1% of GDP in 2007 and the positive fiscal impact of a variety of revenue and expenditure measures. For 2009, they expect the general government deficit to widen somewhat given the pressure on revenues and expenditure which will result from falling activity, rising unemployment and probable fiscal stimulus measures. Overall, they suggest that the general government deficit will widen to 2.5% of GDP in 2009 but should fall back to 2.3% in 2010 - although this surely reflects their benign slowdown scenario whereby a recivery is expected to arrive in H2 2009. The debt-to-GDP ratio is forecast to rise to above 30% in 2010, from 29.4% in 2008.

Conclusion: Central Europe Is All Recession Bound

This is basically the third in a series of posts, where I have looked at the short term outlook for three key central European economies: Poland (here), Hungary (here) and the CR, and the conclusion is that they are all headed into or near to the contraction zone in 2009. Cetainly Hungary is the worst case scenario, and Poland is struggling with a complex set of forex issues, but even the Czech Republic can not expect to escape unscathed.

Previously, as can be see in this chart for the EU Economic Sentiment index, Poland had been faring rather better its Central European neighbours. But the downward movement in Poland is now evident and pronounced, and in fact the contraction may ultimately be sharper than in the CR.


In their January forecast the EU Commission estimated that GDP growth in the Czech Republic would come in at 1.7% in 2009 and then edge up again to 2.3% in 2010. This now seems very much on the high side to me. I expect Czech GDP to be more or less stationary in 2009, with some downside risk to this estimate given the general problem of economic stability in the region and the very serious contraction which is like to take place in the German economy on which the CR is so dependent. I do not expect a resurgence in domestic demand, and the economy will now more than likely become even more export dependent, which leaves us with the omnipresent question, "exports to where"? On the other hand, at the present time we do are not looking at a "boom-bust" scenario, and the CR economy should fare substantially better than many of those around it.